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COMMENT: KEEP YOUR EYES OPEN:
AVOIDING UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES IN JOINT VENTURE
RELATIONSHIPS
Jeanne M. Rickertt
I am delighted to be a commentator on Stephen Fraidin's re-
marks' because I think he has picked, for the practicing lawyer, the
most interesting subject with respect to joint ventures.
Preparing for this and listening to Steve's remarks, I realize
how a joint venture lawyer is different. From the beginning of my
practice, and certainly, with the more joint ventures I work on, I
have learned that the lawyer cannot be confrontational. You abso-
lutely have to understand what the parties are about, what the joint
venture is about, and the objectives of the parties - both of them,
not just your client.
To my way of thinking, the role of the lawyer is to help the
parties understand what the objectives are. The marriage analogy
is useful because the parties do need a level of trust and a level of
commitment to enter into such a relationship. But, as Steve said,
joint ventures end. There are very few joint ventures that keep
going forever. Usually the parties come together, each with par-
ticular skills and particular resources or assets, and for a limited
purpose. Although "strategic alliance" is a more nebulous term,
the same thing is true for alliances.
The world around you changes, things move on, new things
come to the fore - the Internet shows us that. As a consequence,
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the parties need to understand, very carefully, what their objectives
are. Corporate law provides a very useful model in this regard.
The courts say to the board of directors and to management:
"Within the realm of ordinary operations of your enterprise, you
have the benefit of the business judgment rule, and the court will
not second guess what you are doing." The lawyer needs to take, I
think, much the same attitude. I spend very little time on joint
venture negotiations or discussions focusing on what the joint ven-
ture is going to do. If the business people don't know how they
are going to make it work, how they are going to combine their
energies and work towards their business and commercial objec-
tives, there is nothing that I, as a lawyer, can bring to that process.
What I can help them understand is to focus on what they
hope to take away from the joint venture. How do they define a
successful venture? Or, at what point do they have to say the ven-
ture is a failure. Of course, we never call it that. But, the parties
need to identify the point where they will both say, "No, we are
not going to try to make this work any longer. We are ready to
end this - how are we going to get out? What do we want to take
away, and what are our objectives in that regard?" This is where a
lawyer can help the parties focus their thinking.
The real upside is generally not something for the lawyer to
worry as much about. If there is success, the parties will renegoti-
ate. They will find a new deal. They will do the merger or a lar-
ger business combination. They will find a new way to keep going
if it's hugely successful.
Unfortunately, this is part of what gives lawyers a bad name -
you are focusing on the down side. What should happen if the
joint venture isn't working? What if something didn't go quite as
the parties expected? The lawyer needs to focus the parties on that
possibility and on what they can and want to take away if one of
these situations occurs. What the parties will take back depends
on the joint venture, and it is hard to generalize. However, the so-
lution to this problem for any specific joint venture is usually
fairly easy to determine once you understand what each party is
bringing to the joint venture and what the joint venture is about.
A second point I want to make today relates to fiduciary du-
ties. This is very much a lawyer's issue, but it is also a very real
practical problem. Moreover, the law in this area is wholly inade-
quate. Steve also alluded to this practical problem: the role of key
executives and the board that is running the joint venture.
Whether the joint venture is structured as a corporation, a partner-
ship, or an LLC, it will usually have a managing board of some
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kind. This is a decision-making structure that is familiar to the
business people. They're used to a board. They're used to board
meetings. Call it what you will, there will be a board.
Typically, the board members are key executives. These ex-
ecutives are not the "directors" of the businesses that are partici-
pating in the enterprise, but they are key, top level executives who
understand the objectives of the participants. These individuals
are chosen to represent the participants in the joint venture because
they understand the strategic direction that the participants are
bringing to the venture and where the participants want the venture
to go. Often, the key managers of the joint venture are also em-
ployed by one of the participants.
These key executives owe fiduciary duties to the participants.
If a joint venture participant is a public company, its executives
owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders of that enterprise. But, as
Steve told us, the law will impose a duty to the new enterprise. In
other words, under the law, these executives owe a duty to the
joint venture. The duties to the joint venture can clearly conflict
with the executive's duty to the enterprise that appointed him to
his position within the joint venture. Anyone who is representing
a public company going into a joint venture and who does not try
to address this conflict of interest is in trouble. I have never had a
time when I have proposed to address this issue that the parties on
the other side had any disagreement that this issue should be ad-
dressed. Whether they were German or American, from New York
or Minneapolis, everybody understands this conflict. The problem
is also shared by all of the participants and their representatives.
The way it has been addressed in the transactions that I have
been involved with is to state expressly in the documents that the
representatives are entitled to act in the interest of the party they
represent. Typically, shareholders coming together to work out
their differences are not subject to fiduciary duties one to the
other. The directors and employees owe a duty to the enterprise,
but each shareholder is understood to be trying maximize his or
her own best interest. So, if you characterize the people on the
board as representatives of the owners, you can take away some of
the burden of this conflict.
2
2 The parties should consider a clause like this:
xx. Waiver of Conflict of Interest.
(a) Each [equity owner "EO"] hereby waives, on behalf of
itself and the Company [being the Joint Venture], any claim or cause
of action against: (i) the other EO and its Affiliates, (ii) any director des-
ignated or appointed by or at the direction of the other EO, or (iii) any
employee of the other EO or any of its Affiliates made available to the
20031
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Now, this hasn't been fully tested, and it will be an interesting
area to see developed. But you cannot rely on any existing body
of law. There is a model of corporate governance from the U.S.
public corporations, which is very well developed in this country.
In a public company, the directors are agents of the shareholders.
By and large the directors of a public company do not have the
greatest economic stake in the enterprise. So, as an agent, the di-
rectors owe a duty, above all, to the shareholders. The partnership
situation is the fact pattern where the people who have an eco-
nomic stake are also the decision makers. But, the law's model for
partnerships is the "punctilio of honor."
3
Company while remaining an employee of such EO or Affiliate (a "Sec-
onded Employee") for any breach of fiduciary duty to the Company by
such EO, Affiliate, director, or Seconded Employee as a result of a con-
flict of interest between the Company and the EO or any of its Affiliates
which appointed such director or such Seconded Employee.
(b) Each EO acknowledges and agrees that in the event of
any such conflict of interest, each such EO, Affiliate, director, or Sec-
onded Employee may act in the best interest of the EO or such EO's Af-
filiate which appointed such director or such Seconded Employee. This
section entitles an EO and its Affiliates and directors and Seconded Em-
ployees to prefer the interests of the EO over the interests of the Com-
pany or any other EO, but does not permit: (i) action taken solely to
harm the Company or another EO, or (ii) any breach of this Agreement
or any Transaction Agreement.
(c) No director, employee of the Company, or Seconded
Employee shall be obligated to reveal confidential or proprietary infor-
mation belonging to either EO (or to either EO's Affiliates), without the
consent of such EO. No director or Seconded Employee shall be obli-
gated to recommend or take any action in such Person's position as a di-
rector or as a Seconded Employee that prefers the interests of the Com-
pany over the interests of an EO or any of its Affiliates, and each EO and
of the Company hereby waives the fiduciary duty, if any, to such EO or
the Company of such Person in the event of any such conflict of interest.
(d) Nothing in this Section is intended to or shall override
any obligation of either EO expressly provided for in any other agree-
ment to which the Company and an EO are parties.
3 This is the standard articulated by Judge Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545
(N.Y. 1928):
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enter-
prise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct
permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to some-
thing stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of be-
havior.
Id. at 546. The breadth of Judge Cardozo's language is all the more troubling in light of the fact
pattern. Salmon and Meinhard were in a partnership for the term of a lease on a building in
New York City. The two had entered into a written partnership agreement shortly after Salmon
had leased the building to a third party tenant. The term of the partnership was co-terminous
with the term of the existing lease. Salmon was found to have breached his duty to Meinhard
because Salmon failed to include Meinhard in the plans made for the property after the lease
expired. Id. at 545-46. Consequently, joint venture participants should take little comfort from
the language "while the enterprise continues," which is apparently limiting. As a planning
[Vol. 53:897
KEEP YOUR EYES OPEN
Under partnership law, a partner is expected to prefer the in-
terest of the other partner(s) or the enterprise and to give those in-
terests precedence over the partner's own self interest. I submit
that that is not what business people expect when they enter a joint
venture. I think the people understand that they come together for
a purpose, and they hope that purpose will remain a joint purpose
and be successful for both of them. Each of them also understands
that there are limits to what either of them is prepared to do for the
joint venture. Each party has other parts to its business, other ob-
ligations to other lines of business, and other markets. Although
the joint venture brings the parties together to exploit a particular
market, whether it is geographic or by product line, each party has
obligations to other parts of its business. Neither party expects
that it (or the other party) will take all the resources of its enter-
prise and put all of that into the joint venture. From time to time,
each party will need to weigh its options and say: "Does this joint
venture justify further investment?, or is it more appropriate for
this company to invest in other parts of its enterprise?" So, the
business people don't expect to follow the standards the law would
impose on partners in a partnership. I think it is important that the
lawyers try and address this issue so they don't put key executives
in an untenable conflict of interest position.
The final point I want to address today relates to the parties'
commitment, which also relates to Steve's last point. Both parties
want to have comfort that the other side will remain committed to
the joint venture. Each party wants to know that the other partici-
pant will bring to the venture its best efforts in the sphere of the
joint venture.
The way this is typically addressed, with help from antitrust
lawyers, is to describe the sphere of operations for the joint ven-
ture. Then the joint venture participants agree that, in the sphere
of the venture - whatever that is - their joint venture will be each
party's sole and exclusive focus. They will focus their energy for
this kind of product, for this geographic market, for whatever the
business of their venture is defined to be. They agree, at least for
the period they are in the venture, and sometimes for a period after
it ends or after one of them exits, that they will not compete with
the joint venture. This provides comfort that the parties' best en-
matter, careful lawyers and their clients try to expressly limit the scope of the venture (in time,
geography, product line, or otherwise), and try to specifically describe the parties' duties to each
other. As a practical matter, if the parties' rights and duties are understood from the outset, the
risk of misunderstanding and of litigation are minimized. If it is necessary to present the matter
to a tribunal, there is a greater likelihood the decision-maker will reach a result that is consistent
with the parties intent.
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ergy with respect to this opportunity will be directed to the joint
venture.
Steve's last point related to change of control and corporate
governance issues. In that context, a non-compete provision pre-
sents a terrible problem. Assume your joint venture document
says if one party suffers a change in control, the other party has a
put or a call. There may be a time period on the put or the call, or
it can be optional whether the other party will choose to exercise
that right. All of a sudden, there is a change in control, and there
is a non-compete. Assume, as would likely be the case in today's
marketplace and at other points in time, the typical buyer for an-
other company is in an aligned industry and has a related business.
The acquirer sees some synergies or some reason to combine en-
terprises. So, one of the participants undergoes a change of con-
trol, and the buyer is in a related business. At that point, the com-
bined entity on the one side of that joint venture is in violation of
the non-compete. There are very few cases that really impinge on
what the parties can do in a joint venture, but there are several
cases that are truly problematic for interpreting non-competition
clauses in joint venture agreements in the context of a broader
business combination.4 The courts will enjoin a transaction or will
4 See Universal Studios Inc. v. Viacom Inc., 705 A.2d 579 (Del. Ch. 1997) (noting that
Paramount, through a subsidiary, was a partner in a joint venture (JV) operating a cable net-
work). The Partners had a covenant not to compete with the JV, and the parent had guaranteed
the partner's performance. The covenant not to compete and the guaranty expressly bound
affiliates. Viacom bought Paramount, and the court held Viacom in violation of non-compete as
a result of its interests in other cable networks. The court also held that competition with the JV
violated the partner's fiduciary duty of loyalty. Id. at 591; see also Vitalink Pharmacy Services,
Inc. v. GranCare, Inc., 1997 WL 458494 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1997) (entering a preliminary in-
junction to stop merger because after merger GranCare would be, indirectly, in business prohib-
ited by non-compete). This non-compete expressly prohibited indirect participation in the re-
stricted business. Although the defendant argued that the corporation bound by the non-
compete was not in the restricted business, the proxy statement for merger described defendant
as part of an enterprise, and one-third of enterprise value was restricted business. Id. at *8-9;
see also Goodman Mfg. Co. L.P. v. Raytheon Co., 1999 WL 681382 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1999)
(noting that Raytheon had entered a non-compete in connection with sale of business). The
non-compete at issue restricted a portion of the business Raytheon retained after sale. Subse-
quently, Raytheon sold the remainder of the business and claimed to be free of the non-compete
obligation. The court found that Raytheon voluntarily disabled itself from complying with the
non-compete provision, so the plaintiff's claim to enforce the non-compete survived a motion to
dismiss. Id. at *8; see also NationsBanc Commercial Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 1994 WL 9655
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13 1994), 1994 WL 62945 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1994) (deciding Plaintiffs suit for
preliminary injunction claiming defendant's affiliate was engaging in business and that defen-
dant was still subject to non-compete granted to plaintiff when it bought similar business from
defendant). In the first opinion, plaintiff's case survived defendant's motion to dismiss. 1994
WL 9655 at *34. In the second opinion, plaintiff lost the preliminary injunction because the
court narrowly construed key clause of non-compete to bind only seller and held that the clause
did not reach seller and affiliates. 1994 WL 62945 at *3-5.
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certainly find damages in the face of competition in violation of
the joint venture covenants.
So, another key issue for the board of the company thinking
about a joint venture, and for the lawyer advising a participant, is
to understand how a non-compete may come into play in the con-
text of a change of corporate control. Even if the joint venture is
not potentially material in the context of a strategic transaction, if
there is a third party with a right to enforce a non-compete, it will
create a level of uncertainty and a potential for a discount on the
value that the company can command in the marketplace. This is
something that lawyers and other advisors need to watch. The
board needs to consider this when asked to approve a joint venture
transaction. Similarly, the lawyer needs to focus the client on this
issue when structuring a joint venture.
In conclusion, let me say that for a deal lawyer, joint ventures
are the most fun. All participants, the lawyers and the business
people, are in a cooperative spirit. They are very creative as you
work to determine a structure that will let the parties work together
to create or grow a business. Each presents an exciting opportu-
nity, and I enjoy working on them.
2003]

